激励扭曲与经营者行为短期化

Incentive distortion and short-sighted behavior of managers

企业经营者必须将努力在追求短期利润指标和寻求企业可持续发展之间进行最优分配,给定努力向量在效用上完全替代,针对可观测利润指标而制定的激励合约越是有力度就越是诱致经营者去追求短期利润指标而忽视企业的基础管理工作,从而使企业可持续发展得不到保证。

The managers of enterprises must in optimized method manage pursuit of short-term profit and sustainable development, replace the effort vector in utility and pursue the short-term profit according to incentive contracts in pursuit of profit indexes, which makes sustainable development of enterprises not be ensured.