中央银行货币政策的透明与模糊

The Transparency and Ambiguity of the Monetary Policy

本文在权重保守的中央银行框架下,讨论了中央银行目标透明度对经济的影响。本文发现,在一定条件下,货币政策目标模糊一方面可以导致公众通货膨胀预期的提高,降低社会福利;另一方面有助于稳定产出,提高社会福利。当中央银行比较保守时,后一种效应占优于前一种效应,货币政策的适度不透明提高了整个社会的福利。我们的研究可以解释为什么通货膨胀控制比较成功的国家,如美国和德国,其中央银行通常被允许保持一定程度的私密性,其货币政策存在一定程度的模糊性,而许多具有较高通货膨胀率的国家,如以色列、英国、加拿大和瑞典等,开始采用通货膨胀目标制,坚持非常公开、透明的货币政策。另外,本文还讨论了中国货币政策透明度问题。尽管中国当前在货币政策决策和操作上还缺乏足够的透明度,但近年来在透明度的建设方面已取得了很大的进步。由于人民银行近年来非常重视通货膨胀控制,可以被看成是一个“权重保守”的中央银行,因此适度货币政策模糊性的引入可能有助于提高社会福利。

This paper analyzes the effect of monetary ambiguity on the economy under the framework of Rogoff (1985). We find that, on the one hand, the ambiguity of the monetary policy can raise the individuals’expectation of inflation rate, and reduce the welfare of the whole society; on the other hand, it can help to stabilize the output and improve the welfare. If the central bank is conservative enough on inflation controlling, then the first effect will be dominated by the second and the increase of uncertainty of monetary policy can improve the whole society’s welfare. Our discussion can explain why many central banks with low inflations are allowed to keep some secrecy and others not. We also analyze the transparency of the monetary policy in China. We find that rapid progress has been made in China on the transparency construction of monetary policy. With high weight on inflation controlling, allowing People’s Bank of China to have certain degree of ambiguity might improve the whole society’s welfare.