垄断企业营销定价策略中的信息甄别与最优非线性定价模型研究

Research on the Model of Information Screening and Optimal Non-linear Pricing in the Pricing Strategy of Monopolistic Firms

本文从信息甄别原理出发,提出企业可进行最优非线性定价,克服企业定价中因信息非对称、难以确切了解每位需求者的支付意愿而导致的定价困境。通过市场调研将目标市场细分为不同类型,再利用信息甄别原理,针对所划分的各需求类型,设计出一套非线性的价格表供顾客选择,由其自行揭示自己的支付意愿,以最大限度提高企业利润。

Based on the principle of information screening, it brings forward in this dessertation that optimal non-linear pricing, which can get over the pricing dilemma resulting from the hardship of comprehending for a certainty the wiliness of payment due to asymmetric in formation, is feasible in firms. Segmenting the target market into different types by the way of market research, designing accordingly a suit of non-linear price list for different customers based on the principle of information screening, letting customers to show their wiliness of payment, in this way firms can maximize its margin.