产品消费排污的信息不对称与生态标签在国际贸易中的战略操控

Asymmetric Information on Consumption-generated Pollution and Strategic Manipulation of Eco-labeling in International Trade

本文针对产品消费,运用差异减污模型研究发达国家政府对生态标签的战略性操控。结果表明:在价格竞争条件下,发达国家政府实施生态标签,使发展中国家企业的市场份额显著下降;发达国家政府总是有动机设置较高的生态标签减污标准。本文用不同模型确认了参考文献所揭示的重要政策含义:在国际贸易中,即使是自愿的生态标签规则也可进行操控以达到战略目的。

Aimed at the consumption phase of products, by using the differentiated abatement model for consumption-generated pollution (CGP), this paper studies the strategic manipulation of eco-labeling by a developed country's government in international trade. The result of this paper shows that under Bertrand competition between firms the eco-labeling operated by the developed country's government sharply reduces the market share of the firm from the LDC and the developed country's government always has incentive to set a higher abatement standard for eco-labeling. By using a different model, this paper confirms the references' important policy implication: even voluntary eco-labeling may be manipulated for strategic purposes in international trade.