摘要
回顾了委托—代理理论发展的渊源,阐述了新古典委托—代理模型与内生交易费用,用“委托—代理理论”解释了商业银行信贷管理活动中的“惜贷”现象。
This paper reviews the development of the principal-agent theory, expounds the new classical principal-agent mode and endogenous transaction cost, and explains the phenomenon of 'be loath to loan' of the commercial banks in the credit management by using the principal-agent theory.
出处
《科技情报开发与经济》
2005年第2期130-131,共2页
Sci-Tech Information Development & Economy
关键词
委托—代理理论
激励约束机制
内生交易费用
principal-agent theory
excitation and restriction mechanism
endogenous transaction cost
