模仿经纪人演化少数者博奕模型中的合作效应

Optimal Level of Self-Organized Segregation of Evolutionary Minority Game

提出并研究了一种新的演化少数者博弈模型.在该模型中.每个经纪人有一个几率p值.在给定m比特下,每个经纪人以几率p选择去最近相同m比特历史下的取胜方,以几率1 -p作出相反的决定,同时经纪人可以模仿财富高于自己的最近邻邻居的p值并加以修正,数值模拟结果显示,经纪人的新几率p和他最佳邻居的几率之间的相关程度存在一个最佳值 在此处自组织分离效应最强,经纪人自分离成尺寸几乎相同的由极端行为表征的人群和反人群。

The evolutionary minority game by imitating neighbor's p value is investigated. We allow the agent to modify her p value after imitation. Numerical results show that there exists an optimal level of correlation between the agent's new p value and her neighbor's p value after imitation, at which the agents evolve into a state in which they self-segregate into nearly equal-sized opposing groups characterized by extreme behavior.The evolution by imitation can considerably enhances the system's coordination.