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多物品价格歧视拍卖模型(英文) 被引量：3

MODEL OF MULTI-UNIT DISCRIMINATIVE AUCTIONS
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摘要 本文将单物品的 M-参数、对数凹效用拍卖推广到多物品价格歧视拍卖。 This paper extents M parameter log concave from single unit auctions to multiple unit auctions. We have obtained the sufficient and necessary condition for a bid function to be an equilibrium bid function.
作者 龙永红
机构地区 中国人民大学信息学院
出处 《经济数学》 2003年第1期8-12,共5页 Journal of Quantitative Economics
基金 The work has been supported by Chinese NSF grants90 10 30 33and NKBBSFG19980 30 6 0
关键词 M-参数 拍卖模型 出价函数 价格歧视 风险偏好 Auction,bid function, risk preference
分类号 F713.359 [经济管理—产业经济] F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]
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参考文献9

  • 1Vickrey,William,Counterspeculation,auctions,and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance, 16(March 1961) ,8-37.
  • 2Vickrey, William, Auction and bidding games, In: Recent Advances m Game theory (Conference.proceedings), Princeton Univerdity Press, 1962,PP 15-27.
  • 3Holt,Charies A. Jr. , Competitive bidding for contracts under alternative auction procedures, Journal of Political Economy, 88 (June 1980),433-445.
  • 4Riley,John G. and William F. Samuelson, Optimal auction, American Economic Review, 71 (June 1981),381-92.
  • 5Harris, Milton and Artur Raviv, Allocation mechanisms and the design of auctions, Economitrica, 49(November 1981), 1477-99.
  • 6Cox,James C. , Bruce Roberson and Vernon L. Smith, Theory and behavior of single obiect auction,in : Research in Experimental Economics (Vernon L. Smith, ed. ), Vol. 2, Greenwich, CT:JAI Press,1982.
  • 7Cox,James C. , Vernon L. Smith. and Walker, James M. , Auction market theory of hererocgeneous bidders, Economics Letters, 9(1982),319-325.
  • 8Cox, James C. ,Vernon L. Smith and Walker,James M. , Theory and individual behavior of first-price auction, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, March 1988,1,61 - 99.
  • 9Cox,James C. ,Vernon L. Smith and Walker, James M., Expected revenue in discriminative and uniform price sealed-bid auctions, In:Research in Experimental Economics(Vernon L. Smithed. ), Vol.3, Greenwich :JAI Press, 1984.

同被引文献35

  • 1上海车牌拍卖制度“变形记”[J].决策,2008(4):56-59. 被引量：2
  • 2龙永红.经典随机序的细化与不完全信息博弈的比较静态分析[J].经济研究,2011,46(S2):147-154. 被引量：3
  • 3Milgrom P.Putting auction theory to work:The simultaneous ascendin g auction[R].working paper from Stanford University,Department of Econom ies,1998.98002.
  • 4太平洋汽车.上海私车牌照拍卖的历史回顾[EB/OL].http://www.pcauto.com.cn/qcbj/sh/cxpl/0311/24855_1.html,2005.
  • 5罗维.多物品拍卖理论及其在车牌拍卖中的应用[D].上海:上海交通大学,2009.
  • 6Vickrey W.Counter speculation,auctions,and competitive seale d tenders[J].Journal of Finance,1961(16):8-37.
  • 7Klemperer P,钟鸿钧(译).拍卖:理论与实践[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
  • 8Cox,James C,et al.Theory and individual behavior of firs t-price auction[J].Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,March 1988(1):61-99.
  • 9Mcafee R P,et al.Government procurement and international trad e[J].Journal of International Economics,1989,26(3-4):291-308.
  • 10Louis Eeckhoudt,Christian Gollier.Demand for risky assets and the monotone probability ratio order[J]Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,1995(2).

引证文献3

二级引证文献11

经济数学
2003年 第1期

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