多级教育财政的博弈行为及效率研究

Game Action and Efficiency of Educational Finance in Multilevel Government

政府分权是多级教育财政体制存在的原因。一般而言,权力分散对于实现效率、地方责任制和参与而言都较为有利。由于教育财政的层级管理受自然环境、规模经济、总体财政效率、地区公平以及政府职责再次划分等因素的影响,中央政府和地方政府间、地方政府间都存在着相互竞争教育资源的博弈行为,造成效率的损失和政府间的教育资源竞争。因此,合理设置教育财政的层级,加强中央政府对教育资源的调控,实行对地方政府的有效监督,对于减少多级教育财政支出的效率损失将具有重要意义。

Under the influence of natural environment, economy of scale, overall finance efficiency and other factors such as regional equality and allocation of government responsibility, the game action not only exists between central and local government, but also among the local governments which result in the inefficiency and competitions with the educational resources. Therefore, to set the proper level of educational finance, strengthen the central government's regulation upon educational resources and effective supervision on local governments, would be significant.