摘要
存款保险制度虽然保护了存款人的利益,但却带来了逆向选择、道德风险和“银行太大不宜倒”等问题,因此遭致了众多的批评和责难。为解决这些问题,国外学者提出了实行差别费率、存款保险制度私有化、强化市场约束、推行核心银行等改革建议和政策主张。为了避免我国银行体系未蒙其利先受其害,科学构建我国的存款保险制度,应当从存款保险机构、存款保险投保方式、存款种类及赔偿最高额、存款保险费率等方面进行积极、深入地探讨,拿出切实可行的制度设计。
The deposit insurance system,though safeguarding the interest of the depositors,has brought about such problems as adverse selection,moral hazard and “too big to fail” in the banking industry,which account for too much criticism and condemnation.To solve these problems,foreign scholars have proposed reform of the system by means of discriminatory rating,privatizing,enhanced market restraining,core banking,etc.This paper discusses the feasibility of reform of the deposit insurance system in terms of institutions,manners and kinds of deposit insurance as well as the maximum compensation and premium rate.
出处
《天津行政学院学报》
2001年第1期33-38,共6页
Journal of Tianjin Administration Institute
关键词
存款保险
逆向选择
道德风险
Deposit Insurance
Adverse Selection
Moral Hazard