摘要
定义了合作n人费用对策,提出了合作n人费用对策的一种解─—准核,引入了局中人之间的分离关系,证明了准核的存在性。由于准核考虑了每个局中人的利益,故其中的支付向量(分配方案)比核中的支付向量更具有合理性。
The concept of cooperative n-person cost game and the normal kernal as asolution of cooperative n-person cost game are defined. The existence theorem of the normalkernal is proved. It is claimed that the bavoff vector in normal kernal is more reasonable thanthe bayoff vector in kernal because profit of each person is considered.
出处
《曲阜师范大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
1994年第3期48-52,共5页
Journal of Qufu Normal University(Natural Science)
关键词
支付向量
联盟
局中人
费用
对策
bayoff vector normal exceeding measure normal kernal union insider