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我国风险投资机构激励约束机制研究 被引量:3

A Study of Incentive and Constraint Mechanism of Venture Capital Investment Institutions in China
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摘要 20世纪80年代以来,为了解决"资本提供者—风险投资家"、"风险投资家—风险企业"之间的激励约束问题,美国等发达国家风险投资机构主要采取了有限合伙制的组织形式。目前,我国各省市风险投资机构的组织形式基本为事业型公司制,这一方面很难解决风险投资提供者与风险投资运作者之间的产权代理关系;另一方面导致较高的运行成本,使代理者与被代理者双方在投资运作方面存在信息不对称。因此,建立有限合伙制的风险投资机构,解决风险投资提供者与风险投资运作者之间的激励约束问题,是目前我国风险投资机构迫切需要解决的问题。 In order to solve incentive and constraint problems between capital providers and venture capitalists, venture capitalists and venture firms, venture capital institutions in developed countries like US have adopted limited partnership as main organizational form since 1980s. Rights and liabilities between limited partners and general partners in limited partnership of venture capital investment institutions are symmetric; limited partnership has fixed duration; and there are explicit contract provisions to constrain the behavior of general partners; there are also certain incentive mechanism provided for in limited partnership. All of above advantages of limited partnership, combined with advantages of general partnership firms, have circumvented sophisticated balance mechanism of corporate institutions, therefore, are more suitable for characteristics of venture capital investment. In addition, limited partnership has advantages of lower operation costs and more financing conveniences.At present, venture capital investment institutions in China are basically business corporate under public undertaking system, which not only makes it difficult to resolve property rights agency relationship between venture capital providers and venture capitalists, but also bears disadvantage of higher operation costs incurred by information asymmetry between agents and principals. Therefore, main solution to incentive and constraint problems between venture capital providers and venture capitalists is to establish limited partnership system, which is also one of urgent tasks of venture capital investment institutions in our country at present. Firstly, legal barriers which would affect the establishment of limited partnership system of venture capital investment institutions such as those found in General Rules of Civil Law, Partnership Enterprise Law, Insurance Law, Commercial Banks Law and Administration Measures of Pension Funds, must be overcome. At the same time, the building of two main subjects of limited partnership must be enforced.
作者 牛海霞
出处 《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》 CSSCI 2005年第2期82-89,共8页 Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences
基金 国家社会科学基金资助项目(01CGJ002)
关键词 风险投资机构 有限合伙制 激励约束机制 Venture Capital Investment Institutions Limited Partnership Incentive and Constraint Mechanism
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