国有大股东控制权的状态依赖模型

“State Controlling Shareholder”and Corporate Governance

本文认为,国有大股东委托权的有效性是有疑问的,代理方法不能有效解决我国上市公司存在的代理问题;发达经济国家公司治理机制无法有效运用于我国;我国上市公司国有股权与控制权并没有分离,公司治理缺乏最根本的基础。作为改进我国现有治理机制的一种探讨,本文设计了一个控制权状态依赖模型。

The author finds that the effectiveness of the right for the principal is doubtful if the large state-owned shareholder is a principal, the agency approach as a method can't analyze the agency problems existing in Chinese listed companies; the effective corporate governance mechanisms in advanced market economies are not well suitable for China; the corporate governance in China lacks the most basic foundation because there is no separation between the state-owned equity ownership and control in Chinese listed companies; The Problems of Corporate Governance in Chinese Public Listed Companies are more complicated. To improve the effectiveness of China's existing corporate governance mechanisms, we design a model of corporate governance mechanism that specifies a state contingent right for principal. The policy implication is that the presence of the market for managers is important for corporate governance in China if the state-owned equity ownership becomes effective.