论股权泛化条件下的内部人控制

On Insider Control under Ownership Subdivision

普遍认为国有控股上市公司内部人控制严重的根本原因是一股独大,我们对此提出异议。本文首先利用博弈论和实证结果指出股权集中度与内部人控制强度是负相关的;然后通过实证研究中国国有控股上市公司的股权集中度和内部人控制,以及公司治理效率,说明中国的情况似乎与上述规律相反;最后提出了股权泛化的概念,证明由于股权泛化,国有控股上市公司实际上没有大股东,其内部人控制极其严重是股权集中度与内部人控制强度负相关规律的必然表现。因此,国有控股上市公司内部人控制严重的原因恰恰是因为没有大股东。

It is generally accepted view that the basic reason of insider control in the state holding listed companies is that there is only one controlling shareholder in such companies. This paper oppugns this view and put s forward a different explanation. First, game theory and empirical result are used to prove that negative correlation existed between the ownership concentration and the intensity of insider control. Then, the ownership concentration, insider control and the corporate governance efficiency of the state holding listed companies are studied empirically to show that the situation in China seemed to be different from the above-mentioned laws. Finally, the concept of ownership subdivision is brought forward to prove that there is actually no big shareholder in state holding listed companies, which results in serious insider control. Hence, no big shareholder is the exact reason of insider control.