股权激励:能否构成股东价值最大化原则的挑战?

Stock-based Incentives:Do They Constitute a Challenge to the Principle of Shareholders’ Value Maximization?

与利益相关者论认为的股权激励是对公司治理传统的股东价值最大化原则的“挑战”不同，本文指出，由于在实现时机和承担风险等方面的显著差异，股权激励不能简单等同于产权安排，从而并不能构成对股东价值最大化原则的挑战。

While stock-based incentives are regarded by some economists as a new challenge to the principle of shareholders' value maximization, we argue in this paper that since stock-based incentives and arrangement of property rights are significantly different in the distribution of power and risks, stock-based incentives cannot be simply treated as arrangements of property rights and thus do not constitute a challenge to the principle of shareholders' value maximization.