摘要
通过对晚明中国的具体历史环境的考察,尤其是对当时面临货币冲击的初始制度条件的分析,本文试图就中国和西欧之间的“大分叉”进行解释。我们的基本猜想是,中国传统官僚制度中固有的产权保护因素。一方面削弱了制度创新的激励,另一方面又使得产权保护处于高度的不稳定之中。在这样的背景下,引发经济长期增长的货币金融制度之产生。也就无从谈起。由此引申出的命题是,历史上的外部突发事件在深度、广度和方向上对某一“行政-司法-关税”辖区制度变迁或制度创新的影响力,在相当意义上取决于该辖区初始制度状态对外部冲击的敏感性。
This paper tries to explain the great divergence between China and West Europe through an analysis of the initial institutions when overseas silver provided a potential for changes in both regions. Our hypothesis is that the Chinese bureaucracy did not provide enough incentives for innovation and the high volatility of the bureaucracy put property right protection in an unstable position. Under this circumstance, it was impossible for China to develop the financial market that is necessary for long-run economic growth. A corollary to this conclusion is that the persistence, scope, and direction of the impact of an unexpected outside shock on the institutional change in a jurisdiction largely depend on its initial institutions and its sensitivity to the shock.
出处
《经济学(季刊)》
2005年第2期491-518,共28页
China Economic Quarterly