摘要
移动通信业务市场上的两大巨头:中国移动通信集团公司和中国联合通信有限公司,由于缺少足够的营业网点,都依赖社会代理商为自己发展业务,特别是发展新的客户。因此,如何激励社会代理商发展自己的业务使自己的收益最大化,是两大运营商需要思考的问题。文中应用信息经济学委托 代理理论分析了移动通信业务两类代理最优激励合同的问题:代理放号和区域独家全面代理,得出了帕累托最优解。
China Mobile and China Unicom are two tycoons in mobile telecom market in China. They are lack of sales-offices, so they depend on agents for developing their business,including new customers,Therefore,it is a question for them that how to instimulate the agents to develop their business and maximize their benefits.This paper applies agent theory of information econoomics to analyze two optimal modules in mobile telecom market, one is that agents develop clients of mobile telecom for telecom enterprises, another is that China Post does all business of a region for China Unicom, and work out the Pareto Optimal solution.
出处
《南京邮电学院学报（自然科学版）》
2005年第1期76-79,84,共5页
Journal of Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
关键词
委托-代理
双寡头垄断
区域独家全面代理
帕累托最优
Principal-Agent
Double-Oligopoly
One agent doing all business of a region
Pareto optimal
