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管理权力模式与最优契约模式比较分析 被引量:5

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摘要 关于首席执行官薪酬决定机理,管理权力模式强调公司内部控制系统的无效性 导致首席执行官利用管理权力谋取高额薪酬;而最优契约模式则强调薪酬契约的有效性和市 场机制的合理性。本文分析了这两种模式在首席执行官薪酬决定过程中的不同作用,认为两 者之间不是对立而是互补的关系,因而首席执行官的薪酬决定在不同的治理结构下也体现出 相机性特点。最后,本文在比较分析的基础上提出了我国公司在设计首席执行官薪酬时应该 注意的问题。
出处 《外国经济与管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第3期27-32,共6页 Foreign Economics & Management
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