中国上市公司担保行为的实证分析

A Positive Analysis of Guarantee Behavior of Chinese Listed Companies

本文描述和分析了中国上市公司担保行为的统计特征,并对影响中国上市公司担保行为产生的因素进行了实证分析。本文的主要结论是:中国上市公司的担保行为具有保证担保偏好和连续性特征;上市公司通过担保行为承担了本应由银行承担却最终被银行转嫁的对担保贷款风险进行识别和评判的职能;上市公司提供担保的行为使上市公司和银行之间同时存在严重的道德风险和逆向选择问题,相互担保行为使上市公司之间存在严重的逆向选择问题;监管层第一次颁布的监管上市公司担保行为的政策负面影响较大,第二次颁布的政策在金融监管的配合下收效显著。本文还就如何规范中国上市公司担保行为提出了相应的政策建议。

This paper reviews the evolutional process of insurance behavior among Chinese listed companies. Employing a static econometric model,it studies the statistical attributes of such behavior and identifies the key determinants that affect the process of corporate financial insurance. The main conclusions are as follows. First, Chinese listed companies are keen on providing corporate financial insurance on a continuous basis. Second, such corporate insurance mechanism forces the listed companies to identify insurance opportunities and to assess their potential risks. Such functions should be performed by commercial banks, which effectively avoid any risks that are associated with the corporate insurance businesses. Third, the insurance behavior of listed companies creates serious moral hazards, leading to an adverse selection between listed companies and banks, and between listed companies themselves. Fourth, the first regulatory directive issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission appears to have produced some negative results, although the second directive was thought to have worked much better. Finally, the paper puts forwards some policy recommendations as to how to standardize and effectively monitor the insurance behavior of listed companies.