摘要
论文中分析研究了岗位竞争制,与国有企业经理人激励之间的关系。建立了岗位任命制和岗位竞争制的激励产出模型。通过比较与分析,得出了主要的结论:岗位竞争制的激励效果要优于岗位任命制。在文章最后提出一些建议。
This paper studies the relationship of selecting mechanism and incentive of manager in state-owned enterprise, We analysis a model of appointing model ,then we give a new model of competing for post by competing with the appointing model. Finally we give out the main conclusion that competing mechanism is better than appointing mechanism and in the same time we give some suggestions.
出处
《价值工程》
2005年第3期82-83,共2页
Value Engineering
