摘要
192 9年 ,藉南京国民政府推动“革命外交”之机 ,年轻气盛的张学良在东北挑起了中东路事件 ,意图强行收回中方在中东铁路经营管理上应享之权。此举得到蒋介石和南京国民政府的鼎力支持 ,蒋并且试图藉机收回全部路权。对此 ,苏联方面以 1 92 4年中俄及奉俄条约为依据 ,亦不惜以武力相向。蒋则运用外交手段 ,希冀得到各国列强的支持而获得压制苏联的效果 ,却不料各国政府多不赞同中方的做法。结果 ,苏联大举兴兵 ,东北边防军损失惨重 ,张学良被迫单独与苏联订立了城下之盟。此举虽令南京不满 ,蒋却因顾虑到逐渐形成气候的反蒋风潮 。
In 1929 the young and vigorous Zhang Xueliang took advantage of the Nanjing Nationalist Government’s promotion of “Revolutionary Diplomacy,” and provoked the Zhongdong Railway Incident with the aim of forcefully recovering China’s lawful rights in the management of the railway. Zhang’s actions received strong support from Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing Nationalist Government, and Chiang hoped to use this chance to recover all rights over the railroad. The Soviet Union did not hesitate to respond with military action, citing the stipulations of the 1924 Sino-Russian and Fengtian-Russian Treaties for justification. Chiang, on the other hand, relied on diplomacy and hoped to keep the Soviet Union in check by gaining the support of the great powers. But unexpectedly, most of the foreign governments opposed China’s action. Finally, the Soviet Union mounted a large-scale offensive, and the Northeastern Border Guards incurred serious losses, and Zhang Xueliang was forced to sign a separate peace agreement with the Soviet Union. Though the Nanjing Government was not satisfied with this step, Chiang had to recognize it out of concern over gradually mounting anti-Chiang unrest.
出处
《近代史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第1期137-187,共51页
Modern Chinese History Studies