摘要
研究了市场中允许后续进入的企业兼并策略以及对社会福利的影响.揭示了垄断竞争型市场中的兼并行为与寡头垄断型市场的基本差异.研究表明:1)市场的允许后续进入削弱了企业的兼并动机,同时在很大程度上避免了兼并带来的市场过度集中的可能性,有利于社会福利的增加;2)即使允许进入,实际的进入也不一定发生,即使发生也不会产生连锁效应;3)在兼并和可能的进入过程中,消费者与未参与兼并企业(而不是兼并企业)的利益是直接冲突的;4)对于那些会产生后续进入的兼并,消费者总是能获得直接利益.
This paper studies the firm's merging strategy and its influence on social welfare in the market with possibility of successive entry. The conclusions in this paper reveal the basic difference of merging behavior between monopolistic competition and oligopoly. The research shows that: 1) permission of successive entry reduces the incentive of firms to merge and avoid the possibility of high market concentration caused by sequential merging, so as to increase the social welfare; 2) though with permission, actual entry may not happen and must not be in sequential way; 3) consumer's benefit is directly conflicted to that of the firms which are not involved in merging, rather than those merging firms; 4) consumers always get benefit from the merging that can induce successive entry.
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第1期17-23,共7页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372057)
博士点基金资助项目(20010248038).
关键词
兼并
垄断竞争
社会福利
merging
monopolistic competition
social welfare
