摘要
本文在对我国上市公司关联交易进行实证研究后发现 ,独立董事制度能有效约束和减少上市公司为控股股东及其关联方提供担保和抵押现象的发生。但是 ,在约束关联销售和关联方直接占用上市公司资金方面 ,独立董事制度并未发挥有效作用。为此 ,我们应完善独立董事制度并规范大股东行为。
On the basis of an empirical study on the related transactions of listed companies in China, this paper finds that independent directorate system can effectively restrain and reduce the emergence of the listed company's guarantee and mortgage for holding shareholder and affiliated parties. However, in restraining the related selling and the affiliated parties from taking up the fund of listed companies directly, the independent directorate system has not played a substantial influence. So, we should perfect the independent directorate system and standardize the big shareholder's behavior.
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第3期54-60,共7页
Journal of Business Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目 (0 4BJL0 2 7)
南京师范大学"十五""2 11工程"建设项目 (184 32 0 2 5 10 )的阶段性成果
关键词
独立董事制度
关联交易
实证分析
independent directorate system
related transactions
empirical study