机动车辆险中保险公司与汽车修理厂合作分析

Analysis and Study on the Cooperation Between the Insurance Company and the Garage in Motor Vehicle Insurance

在车辆险理赔的过程中,汽车修理厂容易利用自身的信息优势,给保险公司造成经营风险,导致利润流失。运用委托—代理理论讨论了保险公司与汽修厂有效合作的可能性,并且在无限重复博弈的框架下分析了合作的持续性与稳定性,最后提出了相关的建议。

In the process of claim settlement on Motor Vehicle Insurance, the garage tends to make risks to insurance company with its superiority on information. The article sets up a cooperated principal-agent between the insurance company and the garage and analyzes its feasibility. The infinite repeated games are used to analyze its stability .At last the paper makes some suggestions to improve the situation.