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美国金融控股公司加重责任制度的实效评析 被引量:2

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摘要 历史研究和实证研究表明 ,美国金融控股公司加重责任制度对改善子公司的经营状况具有重要作用。加重责任制度抑制了金融控股公司中特有的道德风险问题。加重责任制度存在的问题可以采取一定的措施加以解决。
作者 姜立文
机构地区 华东政法学院
出处 《浙江工商大学学报》 2004年第6期38-42,32,共6页 Journal of Zhejiang Gongshang University
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