内部人控制、财务治理权配置与上市公司股权融资偏好

Insider Control, Disposal of Financial Governance Rights and the Preference to Equity Financing

首先在回顾转轨和转轨经济定义的基础上对我国转轨经济中内部人控制的成因作了简要的分析;然后从财务治理权配置的角度论述了资本结构决策的目标——剩余财务控制权与剩余索取权的对应;最后对我国内部人控制条件下资本结构决策的特点作了详细分析,建立简单模型,证明了转轨经济条件下形成的内部人控制是我国上市公司股权融资偏好形成的根本原因。

This paper first analyses the underlying causes for insider control in the transformation economy with a survey of definition on the transformation and transformation economy; then from the point-of-view of financial governance distribution, concludes that residual rights of financial control should best match the residual claim rights; and next discusses the characteristics of capital structure decision-making; and finally provides a model to show that the insider control is the fundamental reason for the preference to equity financing of listed companies in China.