并行研发联盟中合作伙伴资源投入决策分析

Analysis of Partner's Commitment Decision in Parallel Development Alliance

企业通过联盟获取优势的同时,还面临着合作伙伴低投入的风险。合作伙伴的资源投入主要受利益分配形式和市场回报率的影响。本文在Amaldoss的混合战略模型基础上引入监督成本,进一步分析利益分配形式对联盟成员资源投入决策的影响。结果发现,在一定情况下,平分收益所获得的伙伴预期投入比按投入比例分配所获得的预期投入多,此时采取平分收益能促进联盟成功。这既不同于Amaldoss的观点也不同于传统的联盟管理观点。

Alliances can offer the potential benefit, but they also carry an ancillary risk: the low commitment from partner. The resource investment of partner is affected by profit-sharing arrangements and market rewards. Based on the mixed strategy equilibrium of Amaldoss, this paper introduces monitoring cost to compare the different effects of two profit-sharing arrangements from the view of commitment decision. The result indicates equal profit-sharing arrangement can obtain more capital investment than proportional one under some certain conditions. Consequently under such conditions equal profit-sharing arrangement can promote alliance success, which is different both from Amaldoss's view and traditional view.