不对称信息下工程建设监理制度中的激励模型分析

Analysing the Incentive Model in the Supervising System of Engineering Construction under Asymmetric Information

从业主与监理单位的委托代理关系出发,分析了在委托代理关系下双方所存在的信息不对称和目标不一致,为了促使监理单位努力工作,使工程建设符合业主利益,有效途径是健全激励机制。通过介绍两种常见的报酬方案:预算报酬合约和线性报酬合约,研究了业主如何选择和设计激励合同。将激励机制引入监理合同中,在一定程度上能够抑制不对称信息环境下的道德风险,为我国监理制度的健康发展提供了有益的启示。

From the relation of agency by agreement between clients and supervising company,the author analyses asymmetric information and different objects of both sides under the relation of agency by agreement;and proposes to make use of incentive mechanisms,enabling superivsing company to work hard so that the engineering construction will meet the requirement of tho clients.By presenting budget-based compensation contract and linear compensation contract as two compensation plans in common use,the author investigates how the clients choose and design incentive contract.To put incentive mechanism into supervising contract will be able to suppress moral risk to a certain extent in an enviromment of asymmetric information,and thus provides beneficial inspiration for the healthy development of supervising system in our country.