行政主导性投资与经济增长

Politics-driven Investment in a Growth Model

本文分析了地方官员在做出公共投资决策时面临的政治激励。当政绩考核标准以GDP增长率为主时,为了获得晋升,地方官员会通过扩大公共投资来拉动GDP增长。地方官员面临的激励机制决定了公共投资具有内在的不稳定性。通过基础设施的生产性作用,这种不稳定性会传播到整个经济中。政治激励对经济的扭曲使经济丧失了稳定增长的可能性。要消除这种扭曲,必须彻底改变以GDP增长率为主的政绩考核标准。本文将这一问题正规化,并建立了一个内生增长模型来进行分析。

This paper investigates the political incentive for local officials to expand public investment in China. Under the performance evaluation system based on GDP growth rate, in order to get promotion local officials have an impetus to drive up GDP growth rate through public investment.Public investment under political considerations is endogenously instable and such instability can be spread into the entire economy through the productive forces of public investment.