摘要
对学术不良行为现象进行了分析,建立了一个考虑到学术不良行为者和学术评定(监管)者时间和信息成本的混合博弈模型,并从制度经济学的角度对其进行了分析,并提出了治理学术腐败泛滥的对策.结果表明,造假与打假的行为(策略)是相互制约的,双方理性决策的结果会达成博弈均衡,所得博弈模型对吏治腐败、经济腐败等其它经济现象提供借鉴意义.
The purpose of this paper was to establish a supervision model for controlling multiple learned cheating behaviors in academic environment. The process of dynamic cheating behaviors and academic counterfeits were analyzed. Finally, some advice of controlling cheating behaviors was discussed.
出处
《浙江万里学院学报》
2005年第2期90-94,共5页
Journal of Zhejiang Wanli University
关键词
学术腐败
教育体制
制度变迁
经济解释
academic molestation
education system
supervision model
countermeasures
