机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究

The Empirical Study on the Institutional Ownership and Resources Expropriation by the Related Parties

近年来,一系列财务危机和舞弊事件的出现,使公司治理成为全球范围内倍受关注的研究课题。随着对这一问题研究的逐渐深入,机构投资者持股等更为广义的公司治理机制开始成为实务界和学术界共同关注的焦点。本文检验了机构投资者持股能否有效降低我国上市公司资金被关联方占用的程度。结果表明,前十大股东中存在机构投资者的上市公司被关联方占用的资金显著少于其它公司,同时机构投资者持股比例的增加与上市公司被关联方占用资金的程度呈显著负相关。以上发现意味着目前我国机构投资者已经参与到公司治理中,对公司的经营运作起到一定的监督作用。

With more and more financial distresses and accounting scandals, corporate governance becomes more important in modern economic organizations. Could the institutional investors participate in corporate governance so as to improve firm operation and per- formance is a popular question in recent years. This paper makes an investigation on whether institutional investors in China could effec- tively reduce resources expropriation by related parties of listed com- panies. It was found that the existence of institutional investors in top ten shareholders of Chinese listed companies significantly reduce the resources expropriated by related parities, and the more shares they control the more reduction of the expropriation. The results support that institutional investors in China are capable of monitoting firm operation.