信任、隐性激励与家族企业成长的三阶段模型

Trust, Hidden Motivation, and the Tri-stage Model of Family Firms

本文根据信任的利他基础的不同,将家族企业成长过程分为两权合一、初级的两权分离和高级的两权分离阶段。通过信息对称性的不同假设和引入代理人的内在激励的概念,构建不同阶段企业和代理人的利润和效用函数。对效用最大化和利润最大化的求解说明家族式管理在一定范围内具有很强的经营效率,但在向经营权分离的现代式管理过渡的进程中,家族企业可能经历一个利润下降的“初级阶段”。只有较快掌握组织能力的企业才能最终成长到高级阶段,否则将退回到传统两权合一阶段。

This paper identifies three stages in family firm growth process: bi-power unison, primary bi-power separation, and advanced bi-power separation based on trust altruism. It develops profit and utility functions for firms and agents in different stages via information symmetry hypothesis and intrinsic motives of agents. The solutions to utility and profit maximization show that family style management has high efficiency in a limited range, while family firms may experience a “primary stage” characterized by profit decline during the transition to modern management. Only firms with fast paced organization ability can eventually grow into advanced stage, firms that cannot advance this stage would return to traditional b-power unison.