电子商务中信用模式选择的博弈分析

A Game Analysis on the Choice of Trust Mode in Electronic Commerce

电子商务是一种新的经营理念和商务模式,信用是制约电子商务进一步发展的主要瓶颈。在电子商务中交易者选择何种信用模式是虚拟市场中交易双方相互博弈的结果。完全信息下的静态博弈和动态博弈结果表明:电子商务交易者的双方交易决策是相互影响的,交易一方对另一方的交易行为都会做出积极的反应,买方的选择往往决定卖方的选择;动态博弈时。卖方选择诚实信用模式的必要条件为是诚实信用模式的长期收益大于或等于欺诈信用模式的短期收益,卖方选择何种信用模式的临界点是卖方诚实信用模式的短期收入与社会平均投资利润率的比值。

Electronic commerce is a new business mode in information society and trust mode is the main bottleneck, which hurdles its further development. Which trust mode that traders will choose is the result of the game in the virtual market. In static game, with compete information, it shows that traders' choices interact with each other. And buyers' choice is decided by sellers' action and each side act positively. In dynamic game, sellers will choose the trust mode which assure them the long-run income is bigger or at least equal the short-run income of cheating trust mode. Which trust modes the sellers will choose depend on the ratio between the short-run income of trust mode and the average profits of social capital investment.