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变动供给下的多物品拍卖 被引量:4

Multiple Unit Auction with Variable Supply
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摘要 变动供给下的多物品拍卖是在线拍卖的形式之一,但对这一问题的相关研究未能真正地解决销售商如何确定待拍商品的数量和价格问题。本文就变动供给下的多物品拍卖问题,建立了一个新的决策分析模型,与已有的模型相比,它不仅能同时确定待售商品的数量与价格,而且能有效地避免替代性商品间的外部性损失,为销售商的决策提供参考。 Multi-item auction with variable supply is a popular form of online auction. But the existing research on it has not resolved the problem of how the sellers determine the quantity and the price of the auction products. This paper focuses on multi-unit auctions and establishes a new model. Compared to other models, it not only tells the seller definitely how to determine the quantity and the price of the final sale at the same time, but effectively avoids the externality between substitutable items, which will be for the seller's reference.
作者 范小勇 梁
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 2005年第2期70-74,共5页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70371023)
关键词 决策分析 外部性 变动供给拍卖 B to C商业模式 analysis of decision-making externality auction with variable supply business to customer commercial model
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参考文献7

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同被引文献34

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