摘要
金融腐败在我国各地区普遍存在,商业银行中的违规操作似乎已成为“标准化行为”。本文通过建立两阶段动态博弈模型并对其求解发现,由于监管的直接成本和间接成本的激增,通过加大监管概率来降低违规程度是不可取的;由于存在大量发现而不惩罚的现象,通过加大惩罚概率来降低违规程度的空间是很大的;对金融规则执行者进行更加及时的事后监督,甚至变事后监管为事前监管,是降低更看中当前利益执行者之违规行为的有效途径。
Financial corruption exists prevailingly in China, and the violating operations in banking have nearly been a 'standardized dealing . Through solving a two-stage dynamic game, the paper reaches the following conclusions. First, because of the steep rise on the cost, it is not advisable to intensify the force of supervision. Second, it is better to enhance the probability of penalization. Finally, another effective method is to shorten the time lag.
出处
《北方经贸》
2005年第3期85-87,共3页
Northern Economy and Trade
