创业投资企业的控制权配置与非效率投资行为

Research on Inefficient Investment Behavior and Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Backed Companies

对Tirole的企业融资模型进行了改进。通过引入控制权转移和监督成本变量,分析了控制权的安排对创业投资企业的非效率投资行为的影响,认为投资不足和投资过度现象之间存在着一种松散的交替关系。分析了创业企业家的非人力资产的大小、人力资产的动态特性、非货币收益的大小以及管理团队强弱对其出让的控制权大小、投资扭曲行为的控制权临界点的影响。认为适当的财务契约设计(可转换优先股、一票否决权和多阶段融资)能够改变双方承担的风险比例和有效地缓解非效率投资行为。

By introducing a continuous variable of control right and the monitoring cost to the model of Tirole, this paper extends and rebuilds a two-stage principal-agent model of the venture capital backed companies. The effects of the allocation of the control rights on the inefficient investment behavior are analyzed and some ambiguous substitute relationship between two investment behavior is found in the update model. The paper analyzes the effect of other variables (such as nonhuman assets and private benefits of running the firm) on the equilibrium point of the control rights that EN has to relinquish and the cut-off point of the investment distortion behavior. Finally, the paper draws a conclusion that the appropriate design of the financial contract can change the venture position of the participator and mitigate the inefficient investment behavior.