决定论与机遇论之争:休谟问题的延续(上)——规范数学方法与“具体性的误置”

The Contention about Determinism and Probabilism:The Variation of Humes Question

今天围绕因果关系中决定与非决定的许多争论, 都没能突破决定论与机遇论必居其一的简单逻辑。因果律和机遇律都是对自然规律的数学刻划, 是规范化的数学工具带来的结果。决定论论题的真正焦点是隐藏在其背后的必然性这一抽象的核心范畴, 它引发了因果观中那些最根本的争论。自然具有必然性和完备的秩序信念, 是人类对自然进行理性探索的公设, 是科学存在的前提, 也是因果观念合理性的基础。决定论是逻辑上的必然性在现实世界中的误置, 但机遇论则主张把由数学工具而来的统计相关联系, 作为否定自然规律背后必然性的理由。这与休谟的自然主义如出一辙。今天的有关决定论与机遇论的争论, 其实质仍然是必然性问题。自然规律中必然性如何实现? 这是休谟问题的延续。

Todays contention about determinism and chance have not broken through Mechanisms set pattern following the simplified logic just advocating one or the other. The point at issue of determinism is the key category of necessity, which caused the essential controversies in causality. The conviction that Nature is of necessity and has perfect order is a postulate to human rational probe to the nature. That how does the necessity actualize in natural law is the variation of Humes question. The infinite process of human rational probe to the universe is answering Humes question.