有限合伙制条件下基金管理人的业绩报酬机制分析

An Analysis of Performance Reward Mechanism of Fund Manager under Limited Partnerships

运用委托代理理论对有限合伙制条件下基金管理人的业绩报酬设计进行了分析。研究发现,在对称信息条件下,基金管理人,尤其是年轻的基金管理人出于声誉的考虑,即使在报酬很低的条件下也会努力工作,目的在于尽快建立自己的行业声誉。而在非对称信息条件下,经营能力高的基金管理人在其后续基金的最佳报酬安排是对固定报酬要求的提高,而不是对可变报酬要求的加大,研究为我国企业的业绩报酬激励设计提供了有益的启示。

The performance reward mechanism of fund manager is analyzed under limited partnerships by applying principal-agent theory. The studies are found, under symmetric information, young venture capitalists work hard even if their reward is very low owing to reputational concerns, so that they set up their reputation as quickly as possible. Under asymmetric information, high-ability venture capitalists receive higher fixed reward, not higher variable reward in the second fund, which provide implications for reward incentive mechanism of Chinese enterprises.