摘要
目前我国的土地挂牌出让市场发展还不成熟,相应的法律法规并不健全,缺乏有效的控制和引导机制.文章运用博弈论的方法对政府官员在经营性土地挂牌出让中存在的腐败问题进行分析.在监察机关没有采取有力措施时,对政府官员与开发商之间的关系进行博弈分析;在监察机关与政府官员之间建立了监督博弈模型,并依此确定监察机关对政府官员的监管力度.得出结论:通过增大检察机关派出检查组检查的频率和概率,加大对腐败官员的惩处力度,可以有效的降低政府官员腐败的发生概率.
Due to the lack of corresponding laws, regulations, effective measures and guiding mechanisms, the transaction of shingle selling the state-owned land is still immature. In this paper, Game theory is applied to analyze the corruption of government officials involved in shingle selling the state-owned land. An analysis by the Game theory is first performed on the relationship between land developers and government officials concerned when powerful supervision is not exercised. Subsequently,a Game model for supervising the behavior of the advisory organ and the officials involved. The conclusion drawn by the paper is:Increasing the frequency of supervision and intensifying the punishment on the corrupt officials may effectively bring down the probability of corruptions.
出处
《西安建筑科技大学学报(自然科学版)》
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第2期248-250,254,共4页
Journal of Xi'an University of Architecture & Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基金
陕西省重点研究项目--住宅产业现代化决策工程资助项目 (2 0 0 2 -97)
关键词
博弈论
挂牌出让
监察
game theory
selling land using right by hanging out one's shingle
supervision