国际工程承包中合理低价中标的博弈分析

Game analysis on tender with reasonable low price in international project contracting

针对国际工程承包中所采用的合理低价中标的招标方式,采用博弈论中Bayes Nash均衡的思想,先建立较简单的两人静态Bayes博弈模型,分析此模型并将其推广到多人博弈的情况,得出投标方的最优报价,在此结论基础上建议投标方积极采取措施、降低施工成本以提高中标概率,对招标方而言则要保证一定数量的投标方参与投标以降低中标价、节省投资,从而在理论上为招标方和投标方的行为提供依据.

In review of the tender selected with lower quoted price in international project contracting, this paper adopts Bayes Nash equilibrium in Game Theory which firstly builds a comparatively simple static Bayes game model with two-side. Then, the model was analysed and further expanded to the gaming model with multi-side participation . In the end, the optimal bidding price in the bidders can be obfained. On the basis of this conclusion, th paper suggests that the bidders should take positive measures to reduce construction cost and raise the ratio of acceptance. On the other hand, the owner should guarantee that a certain number of bidders participate in the bidding in order to lower the tender price and save investment. This provides theoretical evidence for the action of both sides.