公共部门工资与就业确定的局部均衡分析

Partial Equilibrium Analysis on Wages and Employment Determination in Public Sector

目前对工资与就业决定机制的理论研究主要集中在市场领域,对于公共部门领域的理论研究十分缺乏。运用新古典方法研究公共部门工资与就业在局部均衡下的确定问题可发现:为实现预算成本最小化的目标,直接控制预算成本可能并不是最优选择,采取先确定编制再确定工资的迂回调整策略应当是理性的选择。此外,非熟练公职人员的吉芬商品特性是导致人才流失的主要原因。

Presently the research on the wage and employment determination mechanism mainly focus on the domain of market, while theoretical research on public sector is scarce. By using neo-classic research method on wage and employment determination in the public sector at partial equilibrium,the author finds out that in order to minimize the budget, the best choice is not to control the budget itself but to determine the organization first. Besides, the author finds that the Giffen-goods-trait of unskilled civil servants is the main factor which leads to brain drain.