委托—代理关系下校长隐性激励与选择略论

Commission—School Principal’s Latent Stimulation and Choice under the Agency Relationship

在现代学校制度设计上,政府与校长是委托—代理关系。为了避免由于非对称信息所产生的道德风险,关键是要通过恰当的契约设计,建立有效的校长激励机制。本文阐述了校长隐性激励的一般原理,具体分析了校长隐性激励机制存在的问题,并对如何建立健全有效的校长隐性激励机制提出了相应的政策建议。

In the design of modern school system, the relationship between government and school principal is commission—agency. The effective principal’s stimulation system should be founded through proper contract design in order to avoid moral risks caused by non-symmetrical information. The article expounds the general principle of school principal’s stimulation system, analyzes the problems of this system particularly and offers suggestions on how to set up and perfect effective school principal’s latent stimulation system.