摘要
在中国的信贷市场上,国有商业银行对国有企业和私营企业区别对待,国有大企业比较容易获取贷款,私营中小企业则融资困难。在戴蒙德声誉模型的基础上,通过博弈分析得出银行往往更倾向于对大客户追加贷款的请求让步,而更多地拒绝小客户,并指出国有大型企业由于与国有银行的长期业务关系能够在一定程度上克服信息不对称。对中国不完善的信贷市场上企业的违约拖欠行为进行了分析。
Information asymmetry in the credit market usually generates more serious consequences. Based on the reputation model that Diamond developed in 1989, the paper attempts to analyze the issues, faced by typical commercial bank, and to simulate the results of such issues in a game-theoretic approach.
出处
《云南财贸学院学报》
2005年第2期44-48,共5页
Journal of Yunnan Finance and Trade Institute
关键词
声誉
违约
银企博弈
Reputation
Breach
Banking Game
