摘要
本文从近期的“圈地”热潮开始谈起,分析了土地与土地权,国家与政府,中央政府与地方政府三组关系,讨论了其对征地的影响,并将重点落到地方政府上面。然后,用经济学的有关理论论证地方政府“圈地”追求的并不是一般意义上的垄断利润,而是其他一些利益。文章提出了建立一套利益制衡机制以遏制地方政府利益追求,试图以此来规范征地行为。
This paper starts its discussion with the problem of recent excessive 'Quandi'(land expropriation) action.First of all,after analyzing three groups of relationships(land and land rights,state and government,center government and local government)and their influences on land expropriation,it sets focus on the behavior of local governments.Then,using some economy methods,it elucidates that what the local governments chase for by land expropriation is not the monopoly profit but some other interests such as political achievements,rents and so on.Finally,the paper presents how to establish a system to restrict local governments and to balance the interests from land expropriation,and by which to rule the action of land expropriation.
出处
《行政与法》
2005年第5期21-23,共3页
Administration and Law
关键词
地方政府
利益
征地
local governments
interests
land expropriation