预测信息披露与盈余管理

The Disclosure of Information Forecasts and the Earnings Management

本文从信息披露的角度出发,通过一个委托-代理模型分析预测信息的披露与盈余管理的关系。我们的分析认为,由于我国上市公司管理层披露的预测信息在一定程度上减少了管理层与投资者间的信息不对称程度,且管理层故意错误地披露预测信息需要承担额外的成本。因此,在一定的条件下,管理层披露预测信息将有利于减少管理层盈余管理行为。相关的实证研究数据也证实了我们的结论。

This study from viewpoint of information disclosure with a model of client-agency investigates the relation between information disclosure and earnings management.Our analysis indicates that information forecasts can decrease the information asymmetry between managers and owners;managers should take on an additional cost for their deliberate forecasting of inaccurate information.So information forecasts of managers can (reduce) the possibility of earnings management.Our empirical analysis proves the view.