摘要
对影响企业经营者报酬的一些因素--董事会控制、经理个人特征、公司经营绩效进行了分析,探讨了董事会在对企业主要管理者--经理(CEO)的激励约束机制控制中的作用.基于我国2001年上市公司的数据,实证分析发现:董事会规模、董事会中独立董事和非独立董事的比例与经理报酬的相关性都不显著,CEO的双重性与经理报酬显著正相关.这表明,在我国上市公司中独立董事的独立性不强,董事会、独立董事在公司经理激励约束机制控制上没有起到应有的作用.实证结果还表明,经理个人特征对经理报酬的解释能力远大于董事会结构变量和公司经营绩效变量对经理报酬的解释能力.
This paper examines the role of board control, chief executive officer characteristics and firm performance in determining management compensation. Based on China stock market data in year 2001, the empirical results show that no significant relation exists between management compensation and board size, the proportion of independent directors on a board. The duality of CEO has significantly positive relation with the management compensation. In addition, the management compensation is much closely related to chief executive officer characteristics than to the board structure and firm performance.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第2期30-39,共10页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(70171054)香港研究资助局(RGC Grant No.CUHK 4302/01H)