控制权转移失效与公司监管缺失:理论及依据

The Nullity of Transfer of Controlling Property Rights and Supervision of Corporations:An Explanation Based on Factor Analysis

分析表明,发生控制权转移的72家公司1999～2003年根据因子分析法得到绩效的综合得分的均值分别为:0.034415、-0.02191、0.011056、0.004784、-0.00382,反映公司业绩呈下降的趋势.控制权转移没有使公司业绩得到改善.公司监管缺失和控制权转移过程中的不规范因素是产生这种现象的重要原因.在目前情况下,加强公司监管是改善公司治理的有效途径.绝不能因为资本市场对公司治理的约束而放弃或忽视对公司的监管.有效的公司监管和资本市场'用脚投票'等机制的共同作用,才能从根本上改善公司治理.

On the basis of factor analysis, this paper shows that the average comprehensive scores of 72 companies with transfers of controlling property rights from 1999 to 2003 are as follows: 0.034415、-0.02191、0.011056、0.004784、-0.00382. This reflects that business achievements of the companies are decreasing, i.e., the transfer of controlling property rights has not improved the business achievements. It is the lack of supervision of corporation and unregulated factors during the transfer of controlling property rights that leads to this kind of phenomenon. Therefore, enforcing supervision of corporations is an effective approach to promote the governance of corporations. We should not give up or neglect supervision of corporations even if the capital market could constraint corporation governance. Only under the joint actions of effective supervision and the institution of casting a ballot by foot on the capital market can the governance of corporations be radically improved.