浅析企业在信息咨询中的不利选择处境与败德行为

Analysis of the Adverse Selection Situation and Moral Hazards of Enterprises in Information Consultation

采用信息经济学中著名的信息非对称理论——柠檬理论的观点对企业在信息咨询中的不利选择处境进行剖析,并对其做出详细阐述。从信息经济学的角度分析企业在实际的信息咨询活动中的败德行为及其产生原因。提出对信息咨询活动主体双方(企业与信息咨询公司)的信息行为进行约束是改变这种状况的方法之一。

Information consultation for enterprises has features of common client-agent relationship, and the enterprises may have two information behavior, i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard, in this relationship. This paper first analyzes the adverse selection situation from the viewpoint of 'lemon theory'—one of the famous information-asymmetry theories, and then elaborates it in detail. In order to prevent the enterprises' moral hazard emergence in the activities, its causes are analyzed from the viewpoint of information economics. At last, the countermeasures are proposed to constrain the information behavior of the two parties, namely, enterprises and information consultation companies, in the information consultation activities.