摘要
银行体系是政府最严重的或有隐性负债的来源。我国的国有商业银行历来是作为政府体系的一部分,因此,政府不可避免地要承担其全部的风险和重组的义务。但是由于道德风险的存在,使得财政在处理国有商业银行财务危机中发生的成本一再扩大。为了控制国有商业银行重组中的财政成本,必须要创造出一种有利于加强各方监督的激励机制,包括进行国有商业银行的公司治理结构改革、建立透明的“风险分享”机制、完善金融机构重组和注资的法律规范、强化公众和法律对金融监管当局的监管。此外,还要规范财政注资的措施,使其显性化和透明化。
The banking system is the major source of contingent hidden liabilities for government. In China, since the state-owned commercial banks have been a part of government system all along, it is inevitable for the government to undertake all risks of state-owned banks and the reorganization obligation. However, due to moral hazards, the fiscal cost has expanded again and again in dealing with the financial crisis of state-owned commercial banks. For the fiscal control in the reorganization of state-owned commercial banks, it is necessary to establish an incentive mechanism good for supervision from all sides, which involves the following: to carry out a reform on the structure of corporate governance in the state-owned commercial banks, to establish a transparent 'risk-sharing' mechanism, to improve the laws and regulations for reorganization and fund assistance in financial institutions, to strengthen the supervision from the public and laws on financial surveillance and administration authorities, and in addition, to standardize the measures of financial fund assistance making them explicit and transparent.
出处
《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》
北大核心
2005年第3期51-55,共5页
JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES
关键词
国有银行重组
财政成本控制
激励机制创建
财政措施规范
reorganization of state-owned banks
fiscal cost control
establishment of incentive mechanism
standardization of financial measures