从博弈角度看银行审贷成本与信贷配给

Analysis on Bank's Censoring Costs and Credit Rationing Based on Game Theory

文章通过一个博弈模型,分析了银行通过贷前审查手段甄别借款人资信时所面临的两难困境,从而揭示了银行在中小企业信贷中实施信贷配给的一个微观机制。由此得到的启示是,解决中小企业贷款难问题的关键,在于营造一个理想的社会化信用环境,改善中小企业整体资信状况。

Through a model of Game Theory, this article analyzes the dilemma that banks will face when they want to identify borrower's credit qualification by the censoring-before-loaning, and opens out a micro-mechanism of credit rationing which happens in SMEs' credit loaning. Based on the analysis, this article agrees that the key of the solution to SMEs' financing problem is to build a good social credit environment and to upgrade SMEs' whole credit level.