基于激励原理的可中断负荷

Interruptible Load Based on Incentive Principle

为克服电力市场条件下,由于负荷的价格弹性不足导致供电公司负荷调节能力下降,而面临较大风险的问题,根据激励理论和传统的DSM方法,提出了基于激励原理的可中断负荷方法,鼓励用户进行积极的负荷调整从而增加负荷的价格弹性。将委托-代理模型应用到供电公司的可中断负荷设计中,对用户属于风险中性和风险规避两种不同的类型分别推导了最优可中断负荷的计算公式,其中考虑了电价对用户负荷的影响,给出了带激励的可中断负荷合同设计的基本步骤。最后通过算例说明了该方法对规避实时市场风险的正确性、合理性。

In order to evade risks caused by lack of elasticity of electrical power load in electricity market, an incentive based interruptible load principle is presented. The principle utilizes basic theory of incentives and load management techniques to encourage customers actively load management in peak-load hours, which increases the elasticity of load. Principal-agent model is employed in risk-evasion interruptible load contract design. The optimal interruptible load method is developed with considering risk-averse and risk-neutral customers, as well as the response of electricity price to load. The basic processes of incentive based interruptible load contract are also given. Simulation results show that proposed methods is correct and reasonable in evasion market risks for distribution utility.